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I’m going to talk about monetary policy risks
under four major headings. First, we need to be
clear about the objectives of monetary policy.
Second, we need to identify various sources of
risk. Third, we need to examine various options
for mitigating the risks we face. And finally, we
need to examine the cost of risk mitigation.
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express here are mine and do not
necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. I thank my colleagues at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for their com-
ments, but I retain full responsibility for errors.
OBJECTIVES
The most fundamental objective of monetary
policy is to contribute to maximum sustainable
economic growth for the United States. The prin-
cipal contribution that monetary policy can make
to economic growth is to maintain low and stable
inflation. High inflation is inevitably also vari-
able inflation; such conditions clearly interfere
with the efficiency of business planning and often
provoke public policy responses, such as price
controls, that damage efficiency. The United States
experienced such a period during the 1970s; infla-
tion was on average rising from 1965 to 1980 and
was quite variable year-to-year. Productivity
growth was relatively low, and the United States
experienced two severe recessions in 1973-75
and 1981-82. Clearly, the 1965-80 inflation was
quite costly; this was a period during which U.S.
monetary policy did not cover itself with glory.
Maintaining low and stable inflation is the
most important monetary policy goal. Only the
E
ven a casual reader of the newspapers
these days knows that the outlook for
the U.S. economy is less certain than
it seemed only a month or two ago.
Perhaps the single most visible sign of greater
uncertainty is the reported decline in auto sales
and production. Also highly visible are declines
in equity prices since their peaks last March,
publicity concerning problems faced by many
of the dotcom companies and power problems
in California.
Those who do not follow monetary policy
issues closely probably have the sense that every-
thing was going smoothly before, whereas just
recently everything has instead become highly
uncertain. In fact, those of us who live and breathe
monetary policy know that the uncertainties are
always there. The subject I will discuss today is
how we should think about the problem of man-
aging monetary policy knowing that various risks
are always in the picture.
As with many business problems, there are
useful ways of thinking about risks that can help
to design policies that make good sense. It would
be a mistake to push the analogy too far, but there
are common elements in managing monetary
policy risks and managing business risks. For
example, at the Federal Reserve we are acutely
aware of risks in our cash operation, where
employees handle large amounts of currency
and we have potential vulnerabilities that arise
when armored trucks come into Federal Reserve
buildings to receive or disgorge cash. Careful and
continuous monitoring of risks when things are
going well is an important part of assuring that
things continue to go well.central bank can deliver success on this front;
other government policies can make life more or
less easy for the central bank, but at the end of
the day sustained inflation cannot occur unless a
central bank permits it.
Suppose the central bank delivers on low and
stable inflation. Can it also contribute to reduced
fluctuations of employment and output? I believe
the answer is yes.
It is important to be very clear about this
point, and so I’ll discuss it carefully. First, both
economic theory and actual experience make clear
that the central bank cannot reduce the average
rate of unemployment by accepting higher infla-
tion. In fact, low and stable inflation may con-
tribute to an unemployment rate that is on the
average lower than it would otherwise be at a
higher rate of inflation. The evidence is not clear
on this issue, so let me adopt the assumption
that the average level of unemployment is inde-
pendent of the monetary policy being pursued,
at least within a significant range. The question
at hand, then, is this: If the central bank cannot
reduce the average level of unemployment, can
it reduce fluctuations of unemployment around
the average level? The answer, I believe, is that
timely adjustments in monetary policy can indeed,
within limits, help to stabilize employment and
output growth. However, the central bank does
not have the power to prevent all fluctuations in
output and employment; trying too hard could
lead to destabilizing the inflation rate, which
would create additional problems. Most impor-
tantly, rising inflation historically has been asso-
ciated with significant recessions, as was true in
1973-75 and 1981-82.
SOURCES OF RISK
To understand how monetary policy responses
can stabilize employment and economic growth,
we need now to turn to the sources of risk. One
extremely important source of risk to monetary
policymakers is incomplete knowledge, includ-
ing especially an inadequate understanding of
how the economy works. The Federal Reserve
has a long-standing research program that is
intended to strengthen knowledge of the economy.
Fed researchers may also contribute their expert-
ise in designing new surveys and data collection
programs to enable us to track current economic
developments better.
One outcome of economics research over the
past 30 or 40 years is that we have a much clearer
understanding of long-run relationships than we
did before. We know enough now to say with
reasonable confidence that sustained long-run
inflation is not inevitable or beyond central bank
control. Moreover, we know that accepting higher
long-run inflation will not raise employment and
economic growth, and may well compromise
success on these and many other important eco-
nomic objectives. However, improved understand-
ing of short-run dynamics has not accompanied
our improved understanding of long-run relation-
ships. In fact, what I think I’ve learned from
research on short-run dynamics is that no claimed
short-run regularity is reliable. Perhaps this state-
ment is too strong, but the common idea 30 years
ago that we could say with some confidence was
that, for example, 25 percent of the ultimate effect
of higher money growth on GDP would appear
in the first quarter, another 20 percent in the next
quarter, and so forth, has largely disappeared
from discussion. We know that the economy’s
speed of response depends on lots of things, and
it just isn’t possible to be confident about how
fast things will happen.
In addition to the Fed’s important longer-run
efforts to improve knowledge, the Fed employs
staff all over the country to obtain the latest pos-
sible information about the current state of the
economy. For example, the research division at
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis maintains
an extensive list of contacts in the business com-
munity and surveys these people in the weeks
just before an FOMC meeting. In addition, I make
some phone calls myself and host luncheons at
the Bank for business executives knowledgeable
about the current state of the markets in which
their firms work. The boards of directors of the
St. Louis Fed and its three Branches in Memphis,
Little Rock, and Louisville are also important
sources of current intelligence on what is going
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the developments that show up later in formal
statistical information collected by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics and other government statistical
agencies.
A second source of risk is shocks of various
kinds that simply cannot be foreseen. An excellent
recent example was the Russian default in August
of 1998 and the financial market disruption in
many Asian countries that followed. At various
times, the U.S. economy has been buffeted by
unpredictable energy price shocks, both positive
and negative, a familiar story to all of us at this
very time.
Another type of risk we face arises from market
misperceptions. The aggregate U.S. economy is
the sum of all of the individual parts of the econ-
omy. Market participants make decisions based
on their perceptions of their own situations and
of likely future events. Sometimes the markets
develop misperceptions about the situation and
as a consequence make mistakes of various kinds.
These mistakes are often only clear in retrospect.
Another source of risk is financial instability.
A dramatic example was the stock market crash
in 1987. Less dramatic instabilities have also been
important from time to time in the past. In the
fall of 1998, policymakers had to contend with
significant problems in the U.S. securities markets.
Historically, the United States has suffered from
financial instability following bank failures. I
would not want to say that market economies
are prone to instability, but it is certainly true
that instabilities of various kinds do arise from
time to time.
There is no need to extend this list of exam-
ples. The message should be clear: Policymakers
always face the risk that unexpected developments
will tend to push the economy off track. Insofar
as possible, we need to design monetary policy
with these risks in mind.
MITIGATING RISK
I have already mentioned briefly the impor-
tance of long-run research and information
gathering in mitigating the risks that arise from
incomplete knowledge. I would add the observa-
tion that the Federal Reserve’s role is not by any
means the only or the largest effort in this area.
Economics research in universities and other
government agencies is extremely important.
Federal statistical agencies provide most of the
data we rely on. Unfortunately, these agencies
are all too often affected by budget pressures that
do not pay adequate attention to the payoff to our
society from a firmer statistical base upon which
to make policy decisions. Those of us with policy
responsibilities need to explain how adequate
resources for statistical agencies can help to reduce
the risks we face.
A critically important aspect of mitigating
risk over time is to understand that monetary
policy must be viewed in the context of a behav-
ioral regularity on the part of the central bank
and not in terms of individual policy actions.
That is, we must view individual policy actions
as reflecting an ongoing policy that in principle
is derived from rule-like behavior on the part of
the central bank. The markets ought to be able to
predict with substantial accuracy how the cen-
tral bank will respond to various circumstances
that may arise. In the absence of such predictabil-
ity, central bank responses to events will often
take the market by surprise; analysts will think
that central bank policy is random, idiosyncratic,
unpredictable, mysterious, and any of a variety
of other adjectives that might be applied. Clearly,
such a state of affairs is not desirable.
An implication of viewing central bank policy
in terms of rule-like behavior is that every indi-
vidual policy action ought to fit, or be consistent
with, the policy rule or regularity. Policy actions
that are irregular in some sense necessarily have
precedent value. Whether the Federal Reserve
acts or fails to act in any given set of circumstances
not only affects the outcome for the economy in
the near term but also affects the future, as market
participants in the years ahead will naturally
look back on the Federal Reserve’s past behavior
to provide clues as to likely policy responses.
So, a policy of mitigating risks over time requires
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long-run context and not just case by case by case.
This dynamic aspect of monetary policy is
quite similar to the problem faced in many busi-
ness contexts. For example, in deciding whether
to settle a case out of court, a company always
must consider the precedent value of the current
action. A company might well decide to take a
particular case to court even though the case at
hand would involve legal costs in excess of the
cost of settling simply because settling might gen-
erate more cases in the future involving similar
demands. In conducting monetary policy, as
with many business problems involving risk
analysis, this dynamic aspect of the connection
between present actions and future economic
behavior and expectations is a critical part of
getting the analysis right.
I am often struck by the assumption that many
seem to have that the Federal Reserve has some
special insight into the future that no one else
has. In fact, the Fed finds itself often surprised
by shocks of various kinds. These shocks are
simply impossible for the Fed or anyone else to
forecast. However, the effects of shocks on the
economy depend critically on the extent of finan-
cial robustness. It is extremely important that we
maintain a financial system that is able to with-
stand the inevitable shocks and surprises. As a
banking regulator, the Federal Reserve has direct
responsibility in this area for the banks it super-
vises; and, the Fed contributes importantly to the
overall design of banking regulation and super-
vision through its advice to the Congress on bank-
ing legislation and its cooperative work with the
other federal banking regulators—the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation. The Fed also
works closely with state banking authorities.
Issues of financial robustness, however,
extend far beyond the areas of direct Federal
Reserve jurisdiction. For example, an issue I dis-
cussed at some length in a lecture in December
concerned the ambiguity about federal support
for government sponsored enterprises, or GSEs.
The market prices debt obligations of GSEs as if
there is a federal guarantee of these obligations,
and yet legally no such guarantee exists for most
of these enterprises. Should there be an unpre-
dicted shock of some sort to one of these firms,
the likely outcome is substantial market disrup-
tion as a consequence of the uncertainty over the
government’s role. This vulnerability in our
financial system can be and should be repaired;
Congress ought to make clear the extent of its
willingness to underwrite or guarantee the obli-
gations of the GSEs, and if the guarantees are to
be made explicit, Congress ought to examine
carefully whether the GSEs are managing their
affairs in a way that is consistent with the inher-
ent risks they face.
One of the sources of risk I noted earlier con-
cerns market misperceptions of various kinds.
Market misperceptions of the way in which mone-
tary policy is conducted are from time to time a
problem. In recent years, the Federal Reserve has
paid considerable attention to the issue of clarify-
ing its policy. I have devoted quite a bit of effort
in my speeches to explain how Fed policy works
and what the major issues are. The issue of policy
clarity is not one that can be fixed permanently,
for conditions change and memories falter. Thus,
I believe that it is extremely important that those
of us involved in monetary policy spend as much
time as possible talking with audiences to explain
what the Fed is doing and why.
One of the sources of risk that I mentioned
was that there are shocks or surprises of various
kinds that cause difficulties in the markets. One
such class of surprise is the policy surprise itself.
I believe that Federal Reserve policy should be
as regular and predictable as the inherent uncer-
tainties of the situation permit. I think it fair to
say that in recent years most policy surprises
have really not been policy surprises per se but
instead policy responses to surprises in the eco-
nomic environment. When economic conditions
appear to be changing rapidly, a policy response
may well be appropriate. In this sense, the policy
action may be a surprise from the perspective of
what was anticipated several months earlier.
Avoidable policy surprises arise when sudden
policy U-turns occur that were not predictable
on the basis of anything observable. The most
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during my professional life was the imposition
of wage and price controls on August 15, 1971.
Almost as surprising was the sharp turn towards
monetary policy restraint on October 6, 1979.
That policy surprise, however, was the inevitable
consequence of replacing the failed monetary
policy of the 1970s with a firm commitment by
the Federal Reserve to a new policy that would
end the inflation. In general, when policy is on
track, it will work most effectively if the markets
fully understand the situation and therefore are
able to predict Fed policy actions with a high
degree of accuracy.
An important part of mitigating risk is for
policymakers themselves to develop a thorough
understanding of unavoidable risk tradeoffs. It is
often the case, even typically the case, that risk
mitigation can never be absolute. Reducing one
risk almost always entails accepting greater risk
somewhere else. Monetary policy is no different in
this respect from any standard business problem.
Economists have long understood that, all
other things being equal, a more expansionary
monetary policy has initial effects of stimulating
economic activity and employment and delayed
effects tending to increase the rate of inflation.
All is well if the central bank is able to apply
monetary stimulus to offset other forces tending
to reduce employment and economic activity. If
the depressing forces dissipate, the monetary
stimulus can be withdrawn; then, the net effect
is that the central bank cushions what would
otherwise be a disturbance to output and employ-
ment without creating a lasting effect tending to
raise the rate of inflation.
That is the general principle, but the problem
of identifying economic forces tending to move
the economy off its desired track and calibrating a
monetary policy response to have the appropriate
effect is by no means easy or without risk. When
the central bank believes that it has identified dis-
turbances calling for a monetary policy response,
the issue is how to calibrate that response to create
the desired outcome without an undue risk of
increasing inflation.
My own view on this matter is that the Fed,
to the maximum possible extent, should rely on
market forces to create the desired effects. When
market participants have confidence in the long-
run outlook for inflation, as they have had for
some years now, those participants will move
interest rates in response to various pieces of
information day by day. Thus, the Federal Reserve
can concentrate on establishing the stable long-
run framework of a policy consistent over time
with low inflation, and allow market interest
rates to adjust actively without the central bank
having itself to respond on a day-by-day or even
quarter-by-quarter basis. Eventually, the devel-
oping situation becomes clear enough that the
Federal Reserve can adjust the intended federal
funds rate to maintain a policy stance consistent
with long-run price stability and with the shorter
run needs of economic stabilization. However,
between the Federal Reserve policy actions,
market adjustments have accomplished much of
the stabilization work.
COSTS OF RISK MITIGATION
As should be clear by now, in the analysis of
monetary policy, the issues are almost always
those of what tradeoffs exist—how the mitigation
of one risk may add to risks in other dimensions.
Let me now take up a couple of specific items not
yet discussed.
I talked briefly earlier of the problem of finan-
cial instability arising from shocks of various
kinds. The fragility occurs when shocks put finan-
cial firms under stress, perhaps even threatening
failure. The United States has a long history of
banking instability; the most dramatic such crisis
arose in the early 1930s, and the end result was
closure of a large fraction of U.S. banks. Similarly,
over the course of the 1970s and 1980s, the finan-
cial position of many savings and loan associa-
tions (S&Ls) became weaker and weaker. The
eventual closure of a large number of S&Ls and
reorganization of the federal deposit insurance
structure was a consequence of a similar process,
which fortunately did not create a generalized
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payers something in the neighborhood of $150
billion dollars to make good on the federal deposit
insurance guarantee.
Banks and many other financial institutions
operate on a fairly narrow capital base. In the
United States today, regulated banks are required
to maintain capital in the neighborhood of 10
percent of assets. That capital provides a cushion
in the event that assets go bad; shareholders bear
the cost of bad bank lending decisions. Many
other types of financial institutions may have
capital that is somewhat lower or somewhat
higher than the approximate 10 percent capital
for commercial banks. Clearly, for any of these
institutions, we run the risk that the losses on
assets will erode capital to the point of raising
doubts about the financial viability of the firm.
When a hard-pressed firm is very large, or when
there are a considerable number of smaller firms
in the same situation, then the impact on the
financial markets as a whole may be severe.
The risks of financial instability can be
reduced by requiring that firms hold more capital.
Moreover, law and regulation can more tightly
control what financial institutions do and the
nature of the risks they assume. However, the
greater the regulatory intervention, the less effi-
cient these firms are likely to be in the long run.
There is substantial evidence to support the
proposition that competitive market processes
lead to more efficiency, a wider variety of finan-
cial instruments, and more innovation over time
than is the case in heavily controlled markets.
Moreover, in today’s world where capital and
information flow freely across national borders,
the prospect is that tight regulation may simply
push certain financial activities abroad out of
reach of U.S. regulators.
This is not the place to enter into an analysis
of financial regulatory issues. My point is simply
to emphasize that what might seem to be an obvi-
ous method of reducing risk—imposing tighter
regulation on financial firms—has potential prob-
lems that are not trivial or easy to overcome.
On a related issue topic, we should also be
aware of the problems that may arise from dealing
with a financial crisis by bailing out firms facing
possible failure. A bailout may calm a particular
situation of market turmoil; however, bailouts
must always be analyzed with due regard to the
moral hazard problem. Whenever a firm is bailed
out, the danger is that, in the future, firms and
investors will expect similar treatment. Expect-
ing bailouts, investors may well assume more
risk than they should; today’s bailout, therefore,
may increase future financial instability. The
issue of public policy toward bailouts is really a
specific example of the more general issue that
policy needs to be thought of in terms of a long-
run regularity of government behavior, and not
just case by case.
Let me finish my discussion of the cost of
risk mitigation by talking briefly about a topic on
which relatively little is known on a systematic
basis. The question is this: Is there a moral hazard
problem to the central bank creating a more stable
economy? That is, if the Federal Reserve contin-
ues to be as successful as it has been over the last
decade in offsetting disturbances of various kinds
and maintaining a continuing economic expansion
uninterrupted by recession, will the more stable
economy create growing imbalances that create
ever greater vulnerabilities? For example, will
households free of concerns abut unemployment
save less and accumulate more debt? Will busi-
nesses unconcerned about recession manage their
operations in such a way that they become ever
more vulnerable to even minor setbacks?
This topic is actually an old one in economics,
but it has renewed interest now precisely because
the current economic expansion has continued
for such a long time. As I am sure everyone knows,
the current expansion, which began in March
1991, is the longest expansion on record.
I am inclined to answer my question by saying
that I believe that the moral hazard risk to con-
tinuing economic expansion is minimal. The
reason is that in our dynamically competitive
economy the macroeconomic risk to individual
firms and households is small relative to the
microeconomic risk. Every individual household
and every individual firm is operating in a highly
competitive environment in which there are risks
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of individual firms, professions, and industries.
Thus, at least until we know more about this
subject, I think there is a compelling case for the
central bank to continue to search for ways to
improve overall economic stability while encour-
aging a full operation of a highly competitive
market system.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Throughout almost my entire professional
career I have analyzed monetary policy as a
problem of decisionmaking in the face of risk. I
wrote my first professional paper on the subject
in 1967, a paper eventually published in 1970.
Today, I’ve emphasized the importance of Federal
Reserve success in maintaining a long-run envi-
ronment of low and stable inflation, and respond-
ing to short-run developments when possible,
but only to the extent consistent with the long-run
objective. That is the way, I believe, that the Fed
can minimize risks.
There is a corollary to this proposition that is
sometimes not appreciated. Consider an analogy:
Suppose a firm conducts a careful analysis of
whether to self-insure or buy fire insurance for a
factory and concludes that it would be best to buy
insurance despite the high cost. If there is no fire,
did the firm make a mistake? The answer is that
it did not in the relevant ex ante sense, if its
analysis was as complete and accurate as existing
knowledge permitted. Similarly, the firm did not
necessarily make a mistake if it decided to self-
insure and then had a fire. Business decisions
should not be judged by the standard of the
Monday-morning quarterback. Nor should mon-
etary policy decisions be judged by the standards
of the Monday-morning quarterback. I am not
claiming that the Fed always gets things right,
but I do insist that the appropriate standard for
judging what we do is the set of conditions as
the game is being played and not by what we all
know happened after the fact.
I close with this observation because, as I
noted in my opening sentences, we face increased
uncertainty at present. I think a lot about how
best to respond to the risks we face, and I’ve
shared with you some of my thinking.
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